Since financing issues of research and development (R&D) directly determine the success of green supply chain initiatives, the choice of funding mechanisms becomes key for green supply chain participants. However, there are few quantitative studies on the financing issues of green supply chains. We study green R&D financing issues for a two-echelon green supply chain, in which a green manufacturer and a regular manufacturer produce and sell green and regular products to a retailer, respectively. External and internal funding mechanisms as well as consumer green loyalty are considered in this study, which encourages green manufacturers to produce environment-friendly products. Three game models, namely, a partially centralized system, government subsidy, and two-part tariff contract scenarios, are formulated to investigate green R&D financing issues. The analytical results show that: (a) Government subsidies cannot effectively promote green manufacturers to improve the greenness of products if the amount of the government subsidy does not exceed a threshold. (b) Under government subsidy schemes, with an increase in subsidies, the output of green products first reaches the level under the partially centralized system, followed by the greenness of products. (c) The two-part tariff contract with a reasonable fixed fee can effectively coordinate retailers and green manufacturers to achieve cooperation, in which the greenness level of products and the retail price are equal to the values under the partially centralized system. (d) Retailers and green manufacturers have different preferences of financing modes; two-part tariff contracts are favored by retailers, while government subsidies are preferred by green manufacturers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental pollution and resource depletion issues have attracted worldwide attention both from practice and from academic communities, as they have become a major threat to the survival and health of human beings [1] , [2] . In recent years, enterprises have been implementing proactive environmental strategies and practices to mitigate their adverse impact on the environment [3] , [4] . For example, PepsiCo and Coca-Cola have developed recyclable PET plastic soft drink bottles instead of corrugated materials to reduce the environmental impact of their products [5] . Green innovation R&D activity has been recognized as a key factor in achieving economic and environmental success in the markets primarily because of the potential benefits of cost reduction, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Osama Sohaib . demand enhancement, and productivity improvement as well as its environmental friendliness in the manufacturing process and low emissions [5] - [7] . Fuji Xerox, for example, uses a re-manufacturing process to produce the Xerox 5100 photocopier, reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 65% [8] , [9] .
Green innovation R&D practices are high-cost and highrisk [10] . As a result, innovation motivation is always not enough for firms [11] . Many governments throughout the world have incentivized industrial firms to carry out green innovation R&D progress [12] . Government incentives may take various forms, such as grants, loans, subsidies and tax concessions [13] . For example, part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $400 million to Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy to fund R&D of energy technologies [14] . In China, the government has adopted various measures to control and alleviate pollution prevention, such as green discount loans, green R&D funds, and green insurance premiums [15] . The 23 EU member states implemented Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) programs between 1990 and 2011 to eliminate cost disadvantages and thus promote investment and innovation in renewable energy [16] , [17] . Among these diverse incentives, subsidies may actually directly stimulate green R&D because with subsidies, innovation becomes cheaper [12] . Environmental firms having received government subsidies are more likely to engage in eco-innovation because such subsidies give these firms more resources and signal certain directions [18] . These directions provide new opportunities for proactive environmental firms to seize new chances through new eco-innovations [19] . Therefore, this paper focuses on government subsidies to better understand the role of governmental financial interventions in green innovation R&D activities.
Improving consumer environmental awareness (CEA) has been an increasingly important market driver, providing strong incentives for manufacturers to implement green innovation R&D activities [1] , [5] , [8] . Consumers are willing to pay a premium for sustainable products because they gain extra utility from these green products [20] , [21] . According to a survey by BBMG's Conscious Consumer Report, 75% of Europeans were willing to pay more for environmentally friendly products in 2008, up from 31% in 2005 [22] . To satisfy consumers' varying green demands and achieve higher profits, retailers and manufacturers are striving to produce products at various green levels [12] , [23] . For example, Adidas has enhanced the greenness of its products through eco-friendly technologies such as MMVEA and Eco-Grip, which not only benefits the environment but also its consumers [24] . Suning uses LED lights in offline stores instead of power-consuming lights to create a green atmosphere for consumers [1] . However, even with government subsidies, it is a challenge for any one company to bear the high costs of green innovation R&D [12] . Manufacturers and retailers often share R&D costs through cooperation contracts. Walmart, for instance, recently worked with its manufacturers to reduce the volume of water used in laundry detergents [25] . In terms of cooperation contracts, we focus on the two-part tariff contract whereby green manufacturers provide green products to retailers and charge wholesale prices and a lump sum fee to retailers. We consider this contract for two reasons. First, in the practice of business-to-business, the two-part tariff contract is the most common coordination approaches in decentralized supply chains [26] , [27] . Second, the two-part tariff contract has already been investigated in some studies (e.g., [28] - [30] ), which provide a theoretical basis for our research.
Although some studies have considered the impact of the external financing (government subsidies) or internal financing (cooperation contract) mode on green innovation R&D issues, few have compared the different impacts of the two types of financing modes on the greenness of products and the profits of supply chain members, or have considered which type of financing mode should be selected from the perspective of retailers or green manufacturers, and which mode is more appropriate under different situations. Unlike previous studies, we pay attention to the importance of green consumers in the decisions of retailers and green manufacturers, and we incorporate consumer loyalty and sensitivity to green products into demand functions. In terms of analysis structures, we differ from previous studies in that we model different decision-making structures (the partially centralized system, the decentralized supply chain with government subsidies, and the decentralized supply chain with a two-part tariff contract). In addition, existing research mainly focuses on a manufacturer-retailer model setting, while there exists competition between the green manufacturers and the regular manufacturers in the market. To depict this competition, we focus on a green manufacturer-regular manufacturerretailer model and integrate the competition and substitution relationship between green products and conventional products into a linear demand function.
This study attempts to fill the gap in the literature related to green innovation R&D financing issues. We investigate and compare the different impacts of external and internal funding mechanisms on product greenness and the profits of supply chain members considering consumer loyalty and sensitivity to green products. Through this comparison, financing mechanism selection under various situations and preference of financing mode for supply chain members are determined. We focus on a two-echelon supply chain, in which a green and a regular manufacturer sell green or regular products to a retailer. The green manufacturer produces green products using green innovation, while the regular manufacturer produces regular products without greenness degree. These two products compete for a certain market share and replace each other to some extent. Given the eco-friendly nature of green products, a green manufacturer is encouraged to produce more green products through external and internal funding mechanisms, including government subsidies and a two-part tariff contract. That is, the green manufacturer could receive green innovation subsidies from the government and a lump sum fee from the retailer to reduce R&D costs.
We focus on the funding issues of green innovation R&D activities and attempt to address the following questions:
• What kinds of ''greenness level'' can be achieved and what price can be set for green products when supply chain members are in a partially centralized system? In this case, what is the profitability of the supply chain (SC)?
• How does the government subsidy affect the ''greenness level'' of products, the price of green products and the profitability of supply chain members under a decentralized channel?
• Could two-part tariff contracts coordinate green manufacturers and retailers to improve the greenness level of products under a decentralized channel to the level under a partially centralized system?
• Which type of financing mechanisms should be selected under various situations and what are the preferences of supply chain members for different financing mechanisms?
• How does the sensitivity to consumer demand and loyalty to green products affect key decision variables (e.g., greenness level of products, retail prices of green products, and profitability of participants)?
To answer these questions, the problem is first formulated as a partially centralized supply chain model and extended thereafter to two decentralized supply chain models with government subsidies or a two-part tariff contract, respectively. A linear demand function is formulated considering consumer loyalty to green products and the substitution relationship between these two products. Analytical results show that government subsidies cannot effectively promote green manufacturers to improve the greenness of products if the amount of government subsidy does not exceed a threshold. Under government subsidy schemes, with an increase in subsidies, the output of green products first reaches the level under the partially centralized system, followed by the greenness of products. The two-part tariff contract with a reasonable fixed fee can effectively coordinate retailers and green manufacturers to achieve cooperation, whereby the greenness level of products and the retail price are equal to the values under the partially centralized system. Retailers and green manufacturers have different preferences for financing modes. Two-part tariff contracts are favored by retailers, while government subsidies are preferred by green manufacturers.
The contributions of this study are as follows: We have filled the gap in the field of financing issues for green innovation R&D by investigating and comparing the impact of external (government subsidies) and internal (two-part tariff contracts) funding mechanisms on the greenness degree of products, product prices, and profits of supply chain members among three scenarios (i.e., a partially centralized system, a decentralized channel with government subsidies, and a decentralized channel with a two-part tariff contract). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compare the various impacts of the two financing mechanisms within a green supply chain using the Stackelberg Game model to determine which should be chosen from the perspective of supply chain members. Our study also addresses two of the four research gaps (i.e., largely neglected market forces and vertically aligned sustainable strategies) identified by Tang and Zhou [31] . Considering that consumer environmental awareness has an important impact on the greenness level of products, we incorporate consumer green loyalty and sensitivity into the demand function, which addresses the first research gap of the largely neglected market forces. Through an analysis of the cooperation between upstream green manufacturers and downstream retailers under a two-part tariff contract, the second research gap of vertically aligned sustainable strategies is filled. In addition, through our investigation, we can determine which contract performs better and which should be chosen from the perspective of the retailer and the green manufacturer, which is meaningful in practical application.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: previous research is briefly reviewed in Section II. The basic model is specified in Section III. Section IV discusses the sustainable analysis and presents some research results. Section V provides a numerical analysis. Conclusions and future research directions are given in Section VI.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper reviews the literature from four aspects. The first part reviews green supply chain management. The second part discusses the influence of consumer behavior on supply chain. The third part analyzes the government subsidy policy in supply chain management. The fourth part is mainly about the channel coordination between manufacturers and retailers.
A. GREEN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
In recent years, green supply chain management has attracted more and more attention from operation management researchers [32] . Seuring and Müller [33] proposed a triple bottom line approach that includes the economic, social and environmental aspects of sustainable development. Many researchers have focused on the relationship between green supply chain management and performance [34] - [36] . Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [34] pointed out that green supply chain management (GSCM) can improve the environmental and economic performance of organizations and motivate organizations to continue green activities. Green, et al. [35] put forward a comprehensive practice performance model of green supply chain management (GSCM) and conducted an empirical analysis, concluding that GSCM practice is both environmentally friendly and beneficial. Through a systematic literature review, Geng et al. [36] studied the relationship between green supply chain management practices and manufacturing enterprise performance, revealing that GSCM practices can bring better economic, environmental, operational and social performance.
Some scholars have explored procurement and inventory strategies in the green supply chain [37] , [38] . Taking into account three procurement scenarios (TSC, SC and TS), Dey and Saha [37] established a two-period supply chain framework focusing on the retailer's procurement decisions and the manufacturer's product greenness decisions, and concluded that the retailer's procurement decision is a key factor influencing the manufacturer's green plan. Dey et al. [38] analyzed the impact of strategic inventory on two types of green products (developmentintensive and marginal-cost-intensive) under three procurement strategies (WS, NI and S), and pointed out that for marginal-cost-intensive green products, the power structure and procurement strategy did not affect the product's greenness. In addition, Nielsen et al. [39] are representatives in the study of green supply chains from an intermediary perspective. They explored the influence of a dominant intermediary on a three-echelon green supply chain with price and greenness sensitive demand in the single and two-period situations. Their results showed that a dominant intermediary enabled the manufacturer to promote products with a lower level of greenness. In the field of sustainable supply chain (SSC), most research focuses on the economic and environmental aspects of sustainable development [28] , [40] - [42] . Based on these studies, we put pricing (economic), greenness (environmental) decision making and consumer behavior into the game model.
B. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
Consumer behavior plays a vital role in supply chain management. Therefore, more and more researchers have explored the impact of consumer behavior characteristics on supply chain decision variables and profits. Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [34] developed a competitive mathematical model that takes into account consumer loyalty to the green supply chain (GSC), and discussed pricing policies, greening strategies and government tariffs determining in supply chains competition under government financial intervals. Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki [28] considered that consumer surplus is an indicator of social welfare, which can promote the sustainable development of society, and built a consumer surplus model based on the price and greening level of products. They found that the consumer surplus may increase as product price rises. Ghosh and Shah [43] studied the impact of greening costs and consumer sensitivity to green apparels on greening levels, prices and profits, and pointed out the upper bound on the fixed fee increases in consumers' sensitivity to greening demand. Using Bertrand model, Safarzadeh and Rasti-Barzoki [44] proposed a multi-stage game model to investigate the technological rebound effect of the efficiency improvement, consumer behavior and manufacturer innovation ability. They found that incorporating consumer behavior assumptions into household energy problems had a significant impact on solving ecological problems. In previous studies, consumer loyalty to green products was not considered in the consumer demand model. Therefore, in our demand function, we not only consider consumer sensitivity to green products but also consumer loyalty to green products.
C. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY
Government subsidies and tax policies have also attracted the attention of many scholars in the field of GSCM. Safarzadeh and Rasti-Barzoki [44] investigated government subsidies/taxes on energy-efficient appliances/related energy to reduce overall energy consumption in the residential sector and found that manufacturer subsidies performed best in energy-efficiency programs. Sheu [45] studied the negotiation problems between producers and reverse-logistics suppliers for cooperative agreements with government intervention and found that the government's financial intervention has a significant impact on the relative bargaining power of green supply chain members in negotiations. Sheu and Chen [46] set up a three-stage game-theoretic model to analyze the effects of governmental financial intervention on green supply chain competition. Their analysis suggested that governments should adopt green taxation and subsidization to ensure that green products are profitable. Safarzadeh and Rasti-Barzoki [47] established a multi-stage game model in two cases (i.e., tax deduction and subsidy policy) to design an effective scheme for the government to control and reduce energy consumption. Their findings indicated that the tax deduction is a more effective way of supporting energy-efficient manufacturers to compete with their peers than subsidy schemes. Mitra and Webster [48] examined the effect of government subsidies on remanufacturer activities in a supply chain system consisting of manufacturers and competitive re-manufacturers. Tsireme et al. [49] explored the impact of government policies on GSC performance and manufacturers' enthusiasm for producing green products. Using game theory and optimization theory, Guo et al. [50] studied the impact of government subsidies on social welfare and profit of supply chain members, and proposed the most effective subsidy policy to maximize expected profit. Nielsen, et al. [51] formulated twelve analytical models to study the effect of government organizations' incentive mechanism (i.e., incentives on total R&D investment and incentives on a per unit product) to encourage manufacturers to adopt green technologies, and found that supply chain members can achieve their sustainability goals through incentives that lead to higher profits.
However, as far as we are aware, none of the above studies have taken into account the impact of government financial intervention on the decision variables of a competitive green supply chain whereby an ordinary manufacturer coexists with a green manufacturer. Hence, we consider the impact of government subsidies on product greenness and supply chain member profits in a decentralized system that includes both a green manufacturer and a traditional manufacturer.
D. COORDINATION MECHANISM
We focus on the literature on operational management based on coordination among supply chain members. Ghosh and Shah [43] and Jeuland and Shugan [52] were early researchers on channel coordination. Subsequently, some scholars discussed different coordination channel mechanisms, such as cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts. Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki [28] studied a two-part tariff contract under a decentralized model and pointed out that the retail price under the two-part tariff contract in the decentralized system is always higher than that without the two-part tariff contract. Bhaskaran and Krishnan [53] conceptualized and formulated the joint development of products involving two firms with differing development capabilities, and examined the impact of arrangements (including revenue sharing, development cost sharing, and work sharing). Their analysis showed that for a new product projects with high timing uncertainty, investment sharing is more attractive, while innovation sharing plays an important role in environments where projects experience uncertain product quality.
Xie et al. [54] discussed sustainable cooperation strategies for competing suppliers in a decentralized supply chain and concluded that cooperation can bring more profits and customer surplus.
Although most of the literature on supply chain has examined channel coordination, few studies have considered the channel coordination issues caused by green supply chain R&D. Therefore, we introduce a two-part tariff contract into models to analyze the coordination between a green manufacturer and a retailer in green innovation R&D activities. The research of Tong and Li [55] is most relevant to our work in terms of comparing the impacts of external and internal financing mechanisms on the greenness degree of products. Their research considers the different impacts of government subsidy and cost-sharing contract on the decision-making and profits of supply chain members. The important differences between our study and their research are as follows: (i) The choice of cooperation contract of the internal financing mechanism is different, and analysis results also differ. Their research object is a cost-sharing contract, while ours is a two-part tariff contract. Thus, the two studies come to very different conclusions. They conclude that a cooperation contract (i.e., a greening cost-sharing contract) cannot perfectly coordinate the green supply chain, while we find that a cooperation contract (i.e., a two-part tariff contract) can effectively coordinate the green supply chain. (ii) Research on consumer behavior varies. In the demand function, they only consider consumers' green sensitivity to products and not their green loyalty. More and more stores provide business modes of points to green consumers to stimulate consumption, evidence of the importance of consumer green loyalty in enterprise operation. Therefore, given this phenomenon, in our demand function, we not only consider consumers' green sensitivity but also their green loyalty. Our research extends that of Tong and Li [55] .
III. THE MODEL
In this section, we introduce the model structure and assumptions. The list of notations used to develop the models is shown in Table 1 . Part A shows the structure of the model, part B provides some assumptions, and part C lists the notations.
A. MODEL STRUCTURE
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer who produces green products, a regular manufacturer producing common products, and a retailer buying the products of these two manufacturers and selling them to the end consumers. Under an external funding mechanism, the government offers subsidies to green manufacturers. In addition, under an internal funding mechanism, green manufacturers set two-part tariff contracts with retailers to reduce R&D costs. The structure of the supply chain under consideration is shown in Fig. 1 . 
B. ASSUMPTIONS
To formulate the problem, we make some assumptions, and the definitions of parameters are depicted in Table 1 .
Assumption 1: We denote θ (θ > 0) as the 'greenness degree' of the product. The higher the greenness degree, the higher the cost of green R&D. Similar to Ghosh and Shah [43] , it is assumed that the production of green products does not affect manufacturers' traditional marginal costs. For green products, the total investment cost of green manufacturers is γ θ 2 /2, where γ > 0 is the coefficient of R&D costs, indicating that the green cost of products shows a convex increase. The unit costs of production for both manufacturers are assumed to be zero, primarily to reduce the complexity of the solution.
Assumption 2: A green and a regular manufacturer (denoted by 1 and 2, respectively) sell their products at wholesale prices w 1 and w 2 to a retailer. Then, the retailer sells products to end consumers at retail prices p 1 and p 2 .
Assumption 3: The demand function is a linear function of the retail price p and the product greenness θ , which is similar to Ghosh and Shah [43] . Thus, the demand function can be described as q = α − βp + ηθ , where α represents the market-based demand, β is the marginal demand of the price of each product, and η > 0 is the green sensitivity coefficient. In this paper, considering consumers' loyalty to green products, the demand functions of green products and regular products are q 1 = αρ − βp 1 + λp 2 + ηθ and
For simplicity, we assume that α = 1 and β = 1. The demand functions can be rewritten as
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the cross price sensitivity coefficient, ρ ∈ (0, 1)indicates customers' loyalty to green products.
Assumption 4: The government offers subsidies (s > 0) to green manufacturers to incentivize them to produce green products, which could stimulate demand for green productions.
Assumption 5: The green manufacturer provides green products to a retailer and charges a lump sum fee F via a two-part tariff contract, which will prompt the retailer to make decisions consistent with the overall optimization of the green supply chain.
Assumption 6: According to the above descriptions, if the manufacturer charges a lump fee to the retailer, the retailer's profit would be π TP r = (p 1 − w 1 )q 1 + (p 2 − w 2 )q 2 − F, and the green manufacturer's profit is π TP m1 = (w 1 + s)q 1 − γ θ 2 /2 + F, where s = 0 means that the government does not subsidize the green manufacturer. And, the profit of the regular manufacturer is π TP m2 = w 2 q 2 .
IV. SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the sustainability of the green supply chain. Firstly, we set the benchmark as a partially centralized system. We then probe whether the external intervention mechanism via government subsidies can encourage green manufacturers to develop green products. Secondly, through a two-part tariff contract to explore the effectiveness of internal coordination, we also analyze the impacts of a lump sum fee on equilibrium decisions and profits. Lastly, we compare the results of the external intervention with the results of the internal coordination to determine the most effective funding mechanism to promote the sustainable development of a green supply chain.
A. THE BENCHMARK: A PARTIALLY CENTRALIZED SYSTEM
We consider a partially centralized system as a benchmark, in which a green manufacturer and a retailer make decisions as a single enterprise. This partially centralized system is superior to the whole centralized system and can reflect the main characteristics and 'greenness degree' of green products. The decision sequence is as follows: The partially centralized system firstly determines the greenness degree of products. The regular manufacturer then decides the wholesale price of regular products. Lastly, the partially centralized system determines the retail prices of both green and regular products. The decision sequence is as shown in Fig. 2 . Under the given assumptions, the profit functions of the partially centralized system and the regular manufacturer are expressed in Eq.(1) and Eq. (2), respectively:
Theorem 1: Under the partially centralized system in which the green manufacturer and the retailer act as a single enterprise, when 2γ (1 − λ 2 ) − η 2 > 0, we get the optimal values of the greenness degree of products, the wholesale price of the regular product, the retail price/sale of the green product, and the retail price/sale of the regular product:
Note: definitions of A 1 , B 1 , C 1 , and D 1 , please see appendix A. Proof: Please see Appendix B. Theorem 1 reveals that product prices, the sales of green products and the profit of the partially centralized system are related to the R&D cost coefficient (γ ), cross-price sensitivity coefficient (λ), green sensitivity coefficient (η), and consumer loyalty to green products (ρ). However, the wholesale prices, production volumes and profit of the regular manufacturer are only related to consumer loyalty to green products (ρ). In particular, as R&D costs (γ ) decrease, the green sensitivity coefficient (η) and consumer loyalty (ρ) increase, and the profit of the partially centralized system will increase.
The most significant influencing factor under the partially centralized system is consumer loyalty to green products.
B. THE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM
Next, we consider decentralized systems where there exists an external intervention (government subsidy) or an internal coordination (two-part tariff contract) mechanism to stimulate production of green products. In these decentralized systems, the green manufacturer, the regular manufacturer, and the retailer make decisions based on their own profit maximization. We use Stackelberg Game structures to analyze the effects of these two funding mechanisms on product greenness and supply chain member profits, where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower.
1) GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY
To promote the sustainable development of the supply chain, the government usually adopts external intervention policies (i.e., government subsidies) to encourage green manufacturers to produce green products. This paper analyzes how external intervention affects the equilibrium decisions of green supply chain members as well as sales of green products and regular products. We then compare these results of the decentralized systems with those of the benchmark to analyze whether government subsidies can improve the sales and greenness of green products. The decision sequence is as follows: the government begins by deciding the subsidy policy; in response to the government's subsidy policies, the green manufacturer determines the greenness degree of products. Next, the green manufacturer and the regular manufacturer set wholesale prices simultaneously. Lastly, the retailer determines the retail prices of green products and regular products according to the wholesale prices of these two products. The decision sequence is as shown in Fig. 3 . The profit functions of the green manufacturer, the regular manufacturer and the retailer under government subsidies can be expressed as:
Eq.(9) shows the profit of the green manufacturer where s is the subsidy that the green manufacturer receives from the government. Eq.(10) represents the profit of the regular manufacturer and the profits of the retailer is expressed in Eq.(11). Theorem 2: Under the government subsidy policy, when 4η 2 − γ (4 − λ 2 ) 2 < 0, we can get equilibrium values of the greenness degree of products, the wholesale/retail price of green products, and the wholesale/retail price of regular products:
Note: definitions of A 2 , B 2 , C 2 , D 2 , G 2 , and F 2 , please see appendix A. Proof: Please see Appendix B. It can be seen from Theorem 2 that the government intervention has an impact on the equilibrium of the greenness degree, sales, and expected profits of the green manufacturer, the regular manufacturer and the retailer. According to Theorem 2, we get Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: 1) θ GI * , π GI * m1 , π GI * r , and q GI * 1 are always increasing in s and ρ.
2) when η 2 (4 − 3λ 2 ) > γ (λ 4 − 5λ 2 + 4), p GI * 1 increases in s, otherwise decreases. Proof: Please see Appendix B. It is intuitive that green manufacturers' profits (π GI * m1 ) increase with government subsidies (s), as these subsidies can reduce the R&D costs of green products and provide green manufacturers with stronger incentives to improve the greenness of their products and produce more green products (q GI * 1 ). Therefore, the greenness of products (θ GI * ) also increases with government subsidies, which reflects the rationality of government subsidies to enterprises to promote the development of green products. For example, since 2015 the Chinese government has provided financial support to encourage vehicle firms to offer low-energy vehicles. In addition, government subsidies to green manufacturers help spread R&D costs, so retailers gain indirectly (π GI * r ) by setting relatively low wholesale prices compared to those in the absence of government subsidies.
Consumer loyalty to green products (ρ) has the same effect on the profits of green manufacturers, retailers, product greenness, and demand for green products as do government subsidies. The most direct impact of consumers' high loyalty to green products is the high demand for green products ( q GI * 1 ) and the high degree of product greenness (θ GI * ). Higher demand for green products can increase the profits of green manufacturers (π GI * m1 ) and retailers (π GI * r ). Therefore, the retailer and green manufacturer can actively guide and promote consumers' concept of green consumption and encourage them to practice green consumption.
Government subsidies have different effects on the price of green products, depending on the sensitivity of consumers to green products. Counterintuitively, when the green sensitivity coefficient (η) is large enough (i.e.,
), increased government subsidies raise the price of green products. This is because consumers pay more attention to the greenness of products when buying products, and a slight improvement product greenness will lead to a large demand. Green manufacturers, with the help of government subsidies, make their products greener. Faced with consumers with a high level of sensitivity to green products, retailers will set a high retail price. Therefore, the price of green products increases with an increase in government subsidies. Conversely, when the green sensitivity coefficient is low, the price of green products will decrease with an increase in government subsidies.
Proposition 1: Under the government subsidy, there exists s 1 and s 2 , where s 1 < s 2 :
Note: definitions of A s , B s , and C s , please see appendix A. The relationship between productions and greenness of green products under the government subsidy and those under the partially centralized system is as follows:
1) when s ∈ [0, s 1 ), then q GI * 1 < q c * 1 and θ GI * < θ c * ; 2) when s ∈ [s 1 , s 2 ), then q GI * 1 ≥ q c * 1 and θ GI * < θ c * ; 3) when s ≥ s 2 , then q GI * 1 > q c * 1 and θ GI * ≥ θ c * . Proof: Please see Appendix B. Proposition 1 reveals that the government subsidies affect two performance indicators of the green supply chain (i.e., the greenness of products and the satisfaction of consumers from the green supply chain). As the government subsidy increases, three events occur. First, when the government subsidy (0 ≤ s < s 1 ) is low, both the consumer demand and the greenness level are not satisfactory and are lower than the performance of the partially centralized system (q GI * 1 < q c * 1 , θ GI * < θ c * ). When the subsidy increases to s ∈ [s 1 , s 2 ), the consumer demand indicator will become satisfactory, but the greenness level is still not satisfactory. Lastly, when the subsidy increases to s ≥ s 2 , both indicators will be satisfactory. Therefore, from the perspective of government subsidy effect, this finding can explain the different aims of the government toward green development; this is why, in many developing countries, some governments offer limited subsidies to promote the production of green products, while governments in developed countries tend to provide large subsidies to upgrade product greenness.
Therefore, it can be concluded that a government subsidy not only positively affects the greenness level but also positively affects the consumer demands. In addition, the effectiveness of the subsidy to enhance consumer demand is higher than its effectiveness to enhance the greenness level. This is because as the subsidy increases, the consumer demand reaches its satisfactory level sooner than the greenness level. The government attaches great importance to popularizing and spreading environmental protection knowledge to consumers, enhancing their green and environmental awareness, and cultivating their green consumption concept in real life, which fully verifies the rationality of this finding. Improved consumer awareness of environmental protection increases the demand for green products, which prompts green manufacturers to produce more green products. When the profit of green manufacturers increases, the environmental protection consciousness of consumers is continually raised and so green manufacturers will improve their products' greenness degree.
2) A TWO-PART TARIFF CONTRACT
In this section, we consider a decentralized model of a green manufacturer and a retailer in the green supply chain that is coordinated through a two-part tariff contract without government intervention.
As discussed in the previous section on the partially centralized system, if the supply chain is fully coordinated, w 1 = c 1 must hold in the decentralized scenario to avoid double marginalization. That is, the retailer obtains the green product at a wholesale price equal to the production cost of the manufacturer. Recall that we assume the green manufacturer's production cost to be zero to decrease the complexity of the solutions. Therefore, w 1 = c 1 = 0 means that the green manufacturer receives negative profits given its investment in green product technology. Thus, without a new source of revenue, the green manufacturer would never make such a decision. To incentivize the green manufacturer to implement green R&D activities, we consider a two-part tariff contract, which is widely used in green supply chain management [29] , [30] .
A two-part tariff contract is a coordination mechanism provided by green manufacturers to retailers [56] , [57] . By adjusting the profit function of retailers (and the profit function of green manufacturers), retailers are encouraged to make decisions that are consistent with the optimal profit of the supply chain as a whole [58] . The green manufacturer offers a two-part tariff contract {w 1 , F}, where w 1 is the wholesale price of the product and F is a fixed fee. The green manufacturer also selects the level of product greenness as θ. The decision sequence is as shown in Fig. 4 . The problem for the green manufacturer, the regular manufacturer, and the retailer are:
Eq. (19) shows the green manufacturer's profit under the two-part tariff contract, where F is the fixed fee received from the retailer. Eq. (20) is an incentive constraint that ensures that the retailer accepts the coordination contract offered by the manufacturer. That is, the retailer's profit under the two-part tariff contract is higher than its profit in the decentralized system without any government subsidy. Eq.(21) and Eq. (22) show the profits of the regular manufacturer and the retailer, respectively.
Theorem 3: Under the two-part tariff contract, when η 2 − 2γ (1 − λ 2 ) < 0, we get the equilibrium values of the greenness degree of products, wholesale/retail price of green products, and wholesale/retail price of regular products:
Note: definitions of F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , and H , please see appendix A. Proof: Please see Appendix B. Theorem 3 shows the equilibrium values of product greenness, fixed fee, and wholesale and retail prices of conventional and green products under the two-part tariff contract.
Proposition 2:
The comparison of equilibrium values under the two-part tariff contract with those under the partially centralized system shows that θ TP * = θ c * and p 1 TP * = p 1 c * , which implies that the supply chain can be coordinated between the green manufacturer and the retailer and serves as a partially centralized system.
Proof: Please see Appendix B. Proposition 2 shows that the green manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain by providing a two-part tariff con-
} and choosing the product greenness which equals the product greenness under the partially centralized system. In particular, the wholesale price (w 1 TP * ) equals the production cost (with the assumption that c 1 = 0) which avoids double marginalization in the decentralized system. This also demonstrates that a win-win outcome can be attained with the two-part tariff contract, the optimal retail price and the greenness level of products are equal to the corresponding values in the centralized system.
Lemma 1: The threshold of the fixed fee (F * ) increases with consumer loyalty to green products (ρ) and consumer green sensitivity (η).
Lemma 1 indicates that the fixed fee set in the two-part tariff contract increases with an increase in consumer loyalty to green products and an increase in consumer sensitivity to green products. The reasons are as follows: The high consumer loyalty and sensitivity to green products mean that consumers have a strong preference for the environmental attributes of the product and are willing to pay extra for green products, thus increasing the demand for green products and improving retailers' profits. Therefore, retailers are willing to pay a high fixed fee to share the cost of green innovation R&D with green manufacturers. In addition, under the two-part tariff contract, green manufacturers have a major say in setting fixed fees, and they can set a relatively high fixed fee to conduct green R&D cooperation.
This also indirectly reflects the importance of consumer green loyalty and green sensitivity in the cooperation of supply chain members. Consumer green loyalty and green sensitivity will not only directly affect the demand for green products and retailers' profits but also indirectly affect the fixed fees set in the cooperation contract. Therefore, retailers and manufacturers must consider consumer green loyalty and green sensitivity when deciding on sales, production, product greenness and financing modes.
Lemma 2: The sensitivities of the product greenness under the two-part tariff contract (θ TP * ) with parameter ρ and η are: ∂θ TP * ∂ρ > 0 and ∂θ TP * ∂η > 0. The higher consumer loyalty and sensitivity to green products induce green manufacturers to produce a greener product.
Proof: Please see Appendix B. Lemma 2 shows that the greenness of products under the two-part tariff contract increases with consumer green loyalty and consumer green sensitivity. Consumer loyalty and green sensitivity to green products have a significant impact on the greenness of products. Consumers' high loyalty and sensitivity to green products indicate that they tend to buy and consume green products, which can directly increase their demand for green products and thus improve retailers' profits. Retailers are more willing to pay high flat fees to green manufacturers to share R&D costs. Since R&D costs are shared by retailers through a two-part tariff contract, green manufacturers have a greater incentive to produce greener products, effectively increasing the greenness of their products. On the contrary, if consumers are not loyal to green products, that is, if they are not keen on green products and their demand for green products is small, then retailers are not willing to share the cost of developing green products with manufacturers. Therefore, manufacturers will withstand significant economic pressure in green R&D and are not willing to actively improve the greenness of products; thus the greenness level of products is relatively low.
Through the analysis of Lemma 2, we find that consumer loyalty and green sensitivity to green products play an important role in deciding product greenness. Therefore, retailers and manufacturers must pay special attention to consumer loyalty and green sensitivity to green products. Retailers can guide consumers to buy green products through advertising and promotion to increase consumer preference for green products. Manufacturers should also incorporate consumer green loyalty and sensitivity into green production decisions. If consumers in the market pay more attention to the level of product greenness, manufacturers should increase their investment in green R&D to produce greener products, which can not only meet the needs of consumers but also increase the profits of manufacturers. 
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
To further explore the impact of the two-part tariff contract and the government subsidy on the greenness degree of products, sales and supply chain members' profits, we use numerical analysis to verify the above results in this section. In addition, to make a clear comparison between these two funding mechanisms, we present these equilibrium results in Table 2 . According to Tong and Li [55] , we assume that the green supply chain has the following characteristics: the R&D cost coefficient γ ∈ [1, 6] , the cross price sensitivity coefficient λ ∈ [0, 1], the greenness sensitivity coefficient η ∈ [0, 1], the customers' loyalty to green products ρ ∈ [0, 1], and the government subsidy s ∈ [0, 1]. The greater the R&D cost coefficient (γ ), the higher the R&D cost. A large cross price sensitivity coefficient (λ) indicates a high substitution rate between two kinds of products. With the increase of consumers' loyalty and green sensitivity, consumers are more willing to buy green products.
A. EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES ON THE OPTIMAL PRODUCTION AND GREENNESS LEVEL OF PRODUCTS
We analyze the impact of government subsidies on the optimal production and greenness degree of green products. We present the results of the numerical analysis in Fig.5 and 6 .
As seen from Fig.5 and 6 , the higher the government subsidy, the higher the greenness of the product and the higher the production volume, which means that government subsidies can encourage green manufacturers to improve the greenness degree of products and increase the production of green products, thus bringing them up to the level under a partially centralized system, which is consistent with Proposition 1. However, the number of government subsidies must reach a certain threshold value in order for the production and greenness level to reach or exceed the level under the partially centralized system. If the subsidy is too low, it cannot effectively stimulate green manufacturers to produce green products. If subsidies are too high, governments will come under pressure to spend their budgets, which explains why, in practice, governments set a certain minimum and maximum value for green subsidies. The minimum subsidy value is set to ensure the effect of the subsidy, while the maximum subsidy value is set to control the amount of fiscal expenditure.
In addition, it can be seen from Fig.5 and 6 that, with an increase in government subsidies, the production of green products first reaches the level under the partially centralized system when the amount of subsidies s 1 = 0.8, and then at the point where s 2 = 1, the product greenness reaches the level under the partially centralized system mainly because green manufacturers must invest a great deal of money and energy in R&D to improve the greenness of products, while an increase in production often does not require R&D investment. Therefore, it is easier for green manufacturers to increase the production of green products than to improve the greenness of products. Under the premise of government subsidies, green manufacturers will first consider increasing production and then improve the greenness level of their products. For the government, it is necessary to formulate environmental policies and take corresponding measures to guide enterprises to push green development into practice. 
B. EFFECTS OF CONSUMERS' GREEN LOYALTY AND SENSITIVITY ON THE FIXED FEE
From Fig.7 and 8 , we can see that the fixed fee under the two-part tariff contract increases in both the consumers' green loyalty and the green sensitivity, which is consistent with Lemma 1.
This finding indicates that the fixed fee in the two-part tariff contract between retailers and green manufacturers increases under high consumer loyalty and green product sensitivity mainly because the high green loyalty and sensitivity of consumers would directly increase the demand for green products, which is beneficial to increasing the profits of retailers. Therefore, retailers are willing to pay higher fixed fees to cooperate with green manufacturers through a two-part tariff contract, which also shows the importance of consumer loyalty and sensitivity to products in the parameter setting of cooperation contracts between upstream and downstream enterprises. 
C. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND FIXED FEES ON THE PROFITS OF RETAILERS AND GREEN MANUFACTURERS
The impact of government subsidies and the two-part tariff contract on the profits of retailers and green manufacturers differ. From Fig.9 , we can see that increased government subsidies could boost profits not only for green manufacturers but also for retailers. However, the increased fixed fee under the two-part tariff contract is beneficial to the profit of the green manufacturer while being unfavorable to the profit of the retailer, as seen in Fig.10 .
The reason for this difference is that an increase in government subsidies can directly increase the profit of manufacturers to encourage green manufacturers produce more green products, which in turn can attract green loyalty consumers to buy green products and improve the demand for green products, thus indirectly increasing the profits of retailers. However, although the increased fixed fee under the two-part tariff contract can increase the profit of the green manufacturer, that fee is deducted from the retailer's profit, which will decrease with an increase in the fixed fee.
In addition, it can be seen from Fig.10 that the fixed fee under the two-part tariff contract cannot be too high. If the fixed fee is greater than 0.2, the retailer's profit will be zero or even negative, so a cooperation between retailer and green manufacturer will not be possible. Fig.11 and 12 show a comparison of the profits of retailers and green manufacturers under the two financing modes. By comparing the profits of the two financing mechanisms, we can clearly see the preference of retailers and green manufacturers for certain financing modes. FIGURE 11. The effect of consumer loyalty and sensitivity to green products on the difference of retailers' profits between the two financing mechanisms (π GI r − π TP r ).
D. A COMPARISON OF THE PROFITS OF RETAILERS AND GREEN MANUFACTURERS UNDER THE TWO FINANCING MODES

FIGURE 12.
The effect of consumer loyalty and sensitivity to green products on the difference of green manufacturers' profits between the two financing mechanisms (π GI m1 − π TP m1 ).
For retailers, the profit under the government subsidy scheme is always less than the profit under the two-part tariff contract. That is, the difference of π GI r − π TP r is always less than zero, as is shown in Fig.11 . The two-part tariff contract has the advantage of boosting retailers' profits. Therefore, compared with the external financing mechanism subsidized by the government, retailers are more inclined to choose the internal financing mode of two-part tariff contract.
With an increase in consumer loyalty, the profit difference between the two financing mechanisms becomes smaller, that is, the profit of retailers under government subsidies is closer to the profit under the two-part tariff contract. However, with an increase in consumer sensitivity to green products, the profit difference between the retailer's profit under the government subsidy and that under the two-part tariff contract is larger. The main reason for this difference is that the increase in consumer green loyalty is mainly reflected in the fact that consumers are more dependent on buying green products. Therefore, consumer demand for green products is high regardless of the financing mode. As a result, the difference in retailers' profits is not significant. Consumer's sensitivity to green products is mainly evidenced by their degree of sensitivity to the level of product greenness because under the government subsidy scheme, product greenness is lower than that under the two-part tariff contract. Therefore, the difference in consumer demand between the two financing mechanisms is significant, which leads to an increase in profit difference for retailers.
For the green manufacturer, the profit under government subsidies is always greater than that under the two-part tariff contract. That is, the difference of π GI m1 −π TP m1 is always greater than zero, as shown in Fig.12 . Under the government subsidy scheme, the green manufacturer can directly obtain subsidies from the government for the production and R&D of green products. Under this financing mechanism, the wholesale price (w 1 ) of green products tends to be higher than the cost of production (c 1 ). Under the two-part tariff contract, however, although the green manufacturer also receives funds from a retailer to implement green R&D, the green manufacturer's wholesale price is equal to the cost of production. Therefore, green manufacturers may be more inclined to choose the government-subsidized financing mode because under this financing mechanism, green manufacturers can obtain higher profits.
With an increase in consumer loyalty and sensitivity to green products, the profit difference of green manufacturers becomes larger. This finding shows that whether consumers are more dependent on green products or pay more attention to the greenness of products, the profit of green manufacturers under government subsidies will be greater than that under the two-part tariff contract.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study investigates green innovation R&D funding issues for a supply chain. A green manufacturer and a regular manufacturer produce green products and regular products in this system, respectively. The socially environmental incentives for the green manufacturer are the governments' production subsidies of green products and consumer loyalty to green products. In addition, within the supply chain system, the green manufacturer can choose internal financing incentives to promote green R&D activities, such as signing a two-part tariff contract with the retailer. These incentives induce green manufacturers to exert green efforts on innovation R&D and produce greener products. In the market, green products and regular products compete and partially substitutes for one another. The profit-maximizing green manufacturer determines the greenness degree of products according to market shares and consumer preferences.
We incorporate consumer loyalty to green products, competition and substitution relationship between green products and regular products into the demand function. First, we formulate the problem as a partially centralized supply chain model, in which the green manufacturer and the retailer make decisions as a single enterprise. Thereafter, we extend the model into two decentralized supply chain models with government subsidies or a two-part tariff contract, respectively. We present the optimal solutions of these models and make comparisons on the greenness level of products and profits of supply chain members between these models. From comparisons and discussions of the decisions between these two financing mechanisms, we have obtained some interesting managerial findings: (1) Government subsidies cannot effectively promote green manufacturers to improve the greenness of products if the amount of government subsidy does not exceed a threshold. Therefore, to achieve the goal of green development, the government should provide an appropriate number of subsidies. (2) Under the government subsidy scheme, with an increase in the amount of government subsidies, the output of green products will first reach the level of output under the partially centralized system. With a relatively high level of government subsidies, the greenness of green products can reach the level of greenness under the partially centralized system. From the government's perspective, when providing subsidies, the government should set the appropriate subsidy amount according to a specific purpose (increasing the output of green products or the greenness degree of products) to play an effective policy role. In addition, the increase in government subsidies benefits both green manufacturers and retailers. (3) The two-part tariff contract with a reasonable fixed fee can effectively coordinate the cooperation between retailers and green manufacturers to achieve cooperation. Under the two-part tariff contract, the greenness level of the product and the retail price are equal to the values under the partially centralized system. In addition, green manufacturers set the wholesale price to zero, which can effectively avoid the problem of double marginalization. (4) The retailer and the green manufacturer have different preferences regarding the two financing modes. The retailer prefers the two-part tariff contract, while the green manufacturer prefers government subsidies. Therefore, to better realize green R&D cooperation, upstream and downstream enterprises must take into account the preference of different financing modes of both sides when choosing financing mechanisms. These findings have a certain value in management practice and can effectively guide production enterprises to choose a financing mode to promote sustainable development. First, when upstream and downstream enterprises need financing for green R&D, the two-part tariff contract is more beneficial for retailers if they take the dominant position in decision-making. If green manufacturers were dominant, the government subsidy mode would be a more appropriate financing mechanism. Second, to encourage the green manufacturer to produce green products and improve the greenness degree of its products, the government must provide appropriate subsidies according to different policy purposes, and the subsidy amount should exceed a certain threshold to enjoy the policy's effect. For example, in 2019, the Chinese government adopted different subsidy schemes to stimulate the development of new energy vehicles. Specifically, the sales subsidies for new energy passenger vehicles are reduced, while the R&D subsidies for charging infrastructure are increased.
This study has several limitations, and there is sufficient room to extend it in the future. Although the demand function has taken consumer green loyalty into account, it is a deterministic linear function. It could be interesting to extend the demand to a stochastic case. From the perspective of government incentives, other subsidy policies, such as sales subsidies to retailers and consumption subsidies to consumers, could be incorporated into the funding mechanisms. From a cooperation perspective, we only consider the two-part tariff contract. In certain supply chain practices, to ensure the success of cooperation, there are other coordination contracts, such as cost-sharing contracts and revenue-sharing contracts. In addition, when green manufacturers and retailers make financing choices, this paper considers the impact of choosing only one financing mode (government subsidy or two-part tariff contract). In practice, however, internal and external financing mechanisms often exist simultaneously. Therefore, in future studies, the influence of both internal and external financing modes on product greenness and supply chain members should be considered.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A
List of Formulas Represented by Letters:
− λs − 6ρ + 6, (A.10)
APPENDIX B
Proof of Theorem 1: Proof: Under a partially centralized system, regular manufacturers make decisions based on their own profit maximization and green manufacturer and retailer act as a single enterprise. Going backwards, the partially centralized system first determines retail prices p 1 and p 2 . The demand functions are q 1 = ρ − p 1 + λp 2 + ηθ and q 2 = (1 − ρ) − p 2 + λp 1 respectively. The combined profit of green manufacturer and retailer is π c = p 1 q 1 +(p 2 −w 2 )q 2 −γ θ 2 /2. The corresponding Hessian matrix is:
As λ ∈ (0, 1), the Hessian matrix is negative definite, and π c is concave in p 1 and p 2 . Therefore, p c * 1 and p c * 2 can be determined as the unique solution to the implicit function . Then, regular manufacturer decides the wholesale price w 2 . And, regular manufacturer's profit is π m2 = w 2 q 2 = w 2 (1−ρ−w 2 ) 2
. As ∂ 2 π m2 ∂w 2 2 = −1, π m2 is concave in w 2 . Therefore, w c * 2 is a unique solution to the implicit function ∂π m2 ∂w 2 = 1−ρ−2w 2 2 = 0 and w c * 2 = 1−ρ 2 . Coming back to the first stage, it is also essential to determine the optimal degree greenness. As ∂ 2 π c ∂θ 2 = η 2 +2γ (λ 2 −1) 2(1−λ 2 ) < 0 if 2γ (1 − λ 2 ) − η 2 > 0, then π c is concave in θ . Therefore, θ c * is the unique solution to the implicit function ∂π c ∂θ =
(1−ρ)λη+η(ρ+ηθ)−2θγ (1−λ 2 ) 2(1−λ 2 ) = 0, and θ c * = η(λ−λρ+ρ) 2γ (1−λ 2 )−η 2 . Finally, inserting θ c * into the equilibrium retail prices, profits and demand functions. So, Theorem 1 holds.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof: In this situation, the green manufacturer, regular manufacturer and retailer will make decisions based on their own profits. The government provides subsidies to green manufacturer. Going backwards, the retailer determines retail prices p 1 and p 2 . And, the retailer's profit is π GI r = (p 1 − w 1 )q 1 + (p 2 − w 2 )q 2 . The Hessian matrix is:
Because λ ∈ (0, 1), then Hessian matrix is negative definite and π GI r is concave in p 1 and p 2 . So, p GI * 
Then, both green and regular manufacturers decide their wholesale prices, w 1 and w 2 simultaneously.
. Therefore, w GI * Finally, green manufacturer decides the optimal greenness. The green manufacturer's profit is π EI m1 = (w 1 + s)q 1 − γ θ 2 2 . Because ∂ 2 π m1 ∂θ 2 = 4η 2 −γ (4−λ 2 ) 2 (4−λ 2 ) 2 < 0 if 4η 2 − γ (4 − λ 2 ) 2 < 0 then, π m1 is concave in θ . Therefore, θ EI * is a unique solution to the implicit function ∂π m1 ∂θ = 2η(2−λ 2 )s+2ηθ+λ+(2−λ)ρ . And, inserting w EI * 1 and θ EI * into the equilibrium retail prices, wholesale prices, demand functions, and profits functions, Theorem 2 holds.
Proof of Corollary 1: Proof: (i) We make the first derivatives of θ GI * , q GI * 1 , π GI * r , π GI * m1 with respect to s as follows:
(A.27)
Because 4η 2 − γ (4 − λ 2 ) 2 < 0, we can get the following results: ∂θ GI * ∂s > 0, (ii) We make the first derivatives of p GI * 1 with respect to s as follows:
. (A.28)
If η 2 (4 − 3λ 2 ) > γ (λ 4 − 5λ 2 + 4), then
Otherwise,
We make the first derivatives of θ GI * , q GI * 1 , π GI * m1 , p GI * 1 , and π GI * r with respect to ρ as follows:
,
2(1 − λ 2 )(γ (4 − λ 2 ) 2 − 4η 2 ) 2 − 2(λ 2 + 2)(1 − ρ)) 2(1 − λ 2 )(γ (4 − λ 2 ) 2 − 4η 2 ) 2 .
(A.33)
Thus, ∂θ GI * ∂ρ > 0, = q c * 1 and θ GI * = θ c * , we have: s 1 = 2γ 2 C s + 4η 4 λ(1 − ρ) − γ η 2 λB s 2γ (4 − λ 2 )(2 − λ 2 )(η 2 − 2γ + 2λ 2 γ ) ,
.
(A.34)
Because, s 1 − s 2 < 0. Proposition 1 holds.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof: First, we analyze the decisions under the decentralized system without any government subsidy, the profit of the green manufacturer, regular manufacturer and the retailer is as follows: π DS m1 = w 1 q 1 − γ θ 2 2 , π DS m2 = w 2 q 2 , π DM r = (p 1 − w 1 )q 1 + (p 2 − w 2 )q 2 . By the backward method, the retailer determines retail prices p 1 and p 2 . The corresponding Hessian matrix is: (1−ρ)+ρλ+ληθ 2(1−λ 2 ) + w 2 2 . Then, both the green manufacturer and the regular manufacturer decides the wholesale prices(w 1 , w 2 ) simultaneously. π DS m1 = w 1 q 1 − γ θ 2 2 , π EI m2 = w 2 q 2 . As ∂ 2 π m1 ∂w 2 1 = −1, ∂ 2 π m2 ∂w 2 2 = −1, π m1 (π m2 ) is concave in w 1 (w 2 ). Thus, w DS * At last, the green manufacturer determines the greenness of products. The green manufacturer's profit is π DS m1 = w 1 q 1 − γ θ 2 2 . As ∂ 2 π m1 ∂θ 2 = 4η 2 −γ (4−λ 2 ) 2 (4−λ 2 ) 2 < 0, if 4η 2 − γ (4 − λ 2 ) 2 < 0, then π m1 is concave in θ . Thus, θ TP * is the unique solution to the implicit function π m1 ∂θ = 0 and θ DS * = 2η(λ+2ρ−λρ) −4η 2 +γ 2 (4−λ 2 ) 2 . And, the profit of the retailer is π DS * r = 4η 4 H 2 −4γ η 2 HK (2H +λ 2 H +3λρ)+γ 2 K 2 (4+5λ 2 −2HA) 4(1−λ 2 )(4η 2 
Next, we consider the case of the two-part tariff contract. First, the retailer determines retail prices p 1 and p 2 . The retailer's profit function is π TP r = (p 1 −w 1 )q 1 +(p 2 −w 2 )q 2 − F. The corresponding Hessian matrix is
Because λ ∈ (0, 1), the Hessian matrix is negative definite and π TP r is concave in p 1 and p 2 . Thus, p TP * 1 and p TP * 2 are solutions to the implicit functions + w 2 2 . Next, both green and regular manufacturers decide their wholesale prices (w 1 , w 2 ) simultaneously. For the green manufacturer's problem shown in Eq. (19) and (20) , constraint (20) binds at the optimal solution, which is typical in moral hazard problems. That is, the green manufacturer can extract all of the surplus from the retailer by selecting an appropriate fixed fee F. Therefore, setting F = (p 1 − w 1 )q 1 + (p 2 − w 2 )q 2 − π DS * r . π TP m1 = w 1 q 1 + F − γ θ 2 2 , π EI m2 = w 2 q 2 . As ∂ 2 π m1 ∂w 2 1 = − 1 2 , ∂ 2 π m2 ∂w 2 2 = −1, π m1 (π m2 ) is concave in w 1 (w 2 ). Thus, w TP * 1 and w TP * 2 are unique solutions to the functions ∂π m1 ∂w 1 = −w 1 2 and ∂π m2 ∂w 2 = 1−ρ+λw 1 −2w 2 2 , and w TP * 1 = 0 and w TP * 2 = 1−ρ 2 . Finally, the green manufacturer determines the optimal greenness and lump sum fee. The green manufacturer's profit is π TP m1 = w 1 q 1 + F − γ θ 2 2 . As ∂ 2 π m1 ∂θ 2 = −2γ (1−λ 2 )+η 2 2(1−λ 2 ) < 0, if −2γ (1 − λ 2 ) + η 2 < 0, then π m1 is concave in θ . Thus, θ TP * is the unique solution to the implicit function π m1 ∂θ = 0 and θ TP * = η(λ−λρ+ρ) 2γ (1−λ 2 )−η 2 = θ c * . F = F 1 +F 2 −F 3 16 , where F 1 = 4γ (2γ (1−λ 2 )(ρ+A 1 )+η 2 λH )A 1
Inserting θ TP * into VOLUME 8, 2020 the equilibrium retail prices, wholesale prices, demand functions, and profits functions, Theorem 2 holds.
Proof of Proposition 2: Proof: From Theorem 3 and Theorem 1, we can get that: 
